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Abstract 
There are disjunctive inferences that can be considered to be illusory, since, when faced 
to them, people tend to draw logically incorrect conclusions. The mental models theory 
can explain this problem by distinguishing between mental models and fully explicit 
models. According to it, individuals often derive only conclusions compatible with the 
mental models, and not with the fully explicit models. However, I try to show in this 
paper that a syntactic approach can also account for the problem of the mentioned 
inferences. It is enough to assume that disjunctions are basically inclusive and that 
exclusive disjunctions require resorting to more complex formulae. 
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1. Introduction 
The problem of the disjunctive illusory inferences refers to inferences with an exclusive 
disjunction embedded in other exclusive disjunction from which individuals usually 
deduce logically invalid conclusions1. A representative example of this kind of 
inference can be the following: 
“You have the bread, or else you have the soup or else the salad” (Khemlani & 
Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 617). 
The particularity of the inferences of this type is that, if the first disjunct (‘you have the 
bread’) is assumed to be true, people tend to draw that it is not possible that you have 
the soup and you have the salad. Nevertheless, as shown below, it is incorrect because, 
following standard propositional logic, this proposition enables the three disjuncts to be 
true at the same time.  
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The mental models theory (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 
2001, 2006, 2010, 2012; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & 
Girotto, 2009; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Oakhill & Garnham, 1996; Orenes & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012) explains and even predicts individuals´ majority answer to 
disjunctive illusory inferences. This fact can lead us to think that the mental models 
theory is the only valid theory of reasoning that can account for this phenomenon. In 
fact, some proponents of it state that other theories cannot do so. In their opinion, 
“No other current theory of reasoning, whether based on formal rules of 
inference (e.g., Braine & O´Brien, 1998a2; Rips, 1994) or on the probability 
calculus (Oaksford & Chater, 2001), predicts the illusions or the remedial effects 
of instructions to think about truth and falsity. These theories could introduce 
fallacious rules in order to predict the illusions, but the resulting system is likely 
to be inconsistent and, in consequence, to predict other sorts of fallacy that do 
not occur” (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 623). 
Certainly, the mental models theory not only explains people´s response to inferences 
with a structure such as that described, but also predicts what kind of additional 
instructions can improve the results. I will not question this point in this paper. It is 
absolutely true that the mental models theory can explain this problem. My goal is to 
show that other alternative type of theories that is explicitly mentioned by Khemlani and 
Johnson-Laird (2009) in the previous quote, the formal rules theories, can also account 
for the facts related to the disjunctive illusory inferences. Indeed, as it will be shown 
below, a syntactic approach can explain both the conclusions that individuals often 
derive from these inferences and the improvement that the additional instructions used 
by Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009) provide. Only one important point needs to be 
recalled in this way: standard propositional calculus considers disjunctions to be 
inclusive and the disjunctions of the illusory inferences are exclusive. 
Thus, I will begin by describing in details the problem of the disjunctive illusory 
inferences and why their logically valid conclusion is not that preferred by people. 
Secondly, after commenting several general theses of the mental models theory, I will 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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show how this theory explains and predicts both the conclusion that is almost always 
deduced by people in this kind of inference and the effects of certain additional data in 
it. Then, I will argue that a formal approach can also account for that conclusion and 
those effects. Finally, I will analyze the possibility that my explanation is compatible 
with the theses of formal theories such as the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & 
O´Brien, 1998a). 
2. The problem of the disjunctive illusory inferences 
If the previous example referring to the bread, the soup, and the salad is taken into 
account, and it is assumed that ‘V’ stands for the logical exclusive disjunction, it can be 
said tha orm of its first premise is as follows: t the logical f
p V (q V r) 
Where ‘p’ represents ‘you have the bread’, ‘q’ refers to ‘you have the soup’, and ‘r’ 
means ‘you have the salad’. 
In this way, the second premise would be the disjunct assumed to be true, i.e.: 
p 
As mentioned, faced to this scenario, people tend to draw the conclusion that you 
cannot have  the soup and the salad.  In other words,  if  ‘¬’  is considered to be the 
logical denial, individuals usually deduce ¬q and ¬r. This is not correct in standard 
logic because that logic allows p to be true, q V r to be false, and q and r to be true 
at the s ble 1 ame time. In can be checked in Ta
Table 1. Truth table of p V (q V   r) 
Vp  q r  q   r p V (q V r)
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
 
López Astorga: disjunctive illusory inferences 126 
In Table 1, ‘1’ stands for ‘true’ and ‘0’ represents ‘false’, and, as it can be seen in it, 
there is a case in which, while p is true and q V r is false, p V (q V r), q, and r are 
true. As  it  is well  known,  according  to  standard  logic,  an  exclusive disjunction  is 
true when a disjunct  is  true and  the other disjunct  is  false. Otherwise  (when  the 
two  disjuncts  are  true  or  the  two  disjuncts  are  false),  the  logical  exclusive 
disjunction is false. Thus, the relevant case here is that corresponding to the first 
row.  If  we  assume  that  ‘v’  refers  to  the  truth‐value  of  the  formula  following 
between brackets, it can be stated that, 
If v(p) = 1, v(q) = 1, and v(r) = 1, then v(q V r) = 0. However, if v(p) = 1 and 
v(q V r) = 0, then v[p V (q V r)] = 1. 
Therefore,  it  is possible  that,  in  the example considered, you  have  the bread,  the 
soup, and the salad at the same time. 
This  circumstance  can  lead  one  to  think  that  human  mind  does  not  follow  the 
requirements of  standard  logic. Nevertheless,  in  that  case,  it  seems necessary an 
alternative framework that can account for this problem. Undoubtedly, the mental 
models theory gives us such a framework. 
3. The mental models theory and disjunctions 
As far as the problem of disjunctive illusory inferences is concerned, there are two 
relevant aspects of the mental models theory that need to be considered. Firstly, this 
theory claims that human reasoning is a basically semantic process in which the 
possibilities or models of propositions are identified and combined. Thus, only the 
models referring to cases in which both the premises and the conclusion are true are 
taken into account. Secondly, the models always represent situations in which the 
proposition is true, and there are models that can be easily detected and models that 
require additional effort to be identified. The models that can be easily detected are 
called ‘mental models’ and the models that require effort are denominated ‘fully explicit 
models’. In this way, the mental models of a proposition such as p V q are simply: 
p 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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q 
Nonetheless, the fully explicit models of this same proposition are the following: 
p and ¬q 
¬p and q 
This distinction between mental models and fully explicit models is always important, 
but it is especially relevant in the case of the disjunctive illusory inferences. In such 
inferences, as mentioned, there is an exclusive disjunction included in other exclusive 
disjunction and, obviously, this circumstance has an influence on the models. In this 
way, the mental models of a proposition such as p V (q V r) are these ones: 
p 
q 
r 
However, its fully explicit models are: 
p and q and r 
p and ¬q and ¬r 
¬p and q and ¬r 
¬p and ¬q and r 
As it can be seen in Table 1, these four models refer to the four cases in which v[p V (q 
V r)] = 1 (first, fourth, sixth, and seventh rows). Nevertheless, it is important to indicate 
that the mental models theory does not state that human beings reason following the 
truth tables of standard logic. On the one hand, as said, it is possible that individuals 
only pay attention to the mental models, and not to the fully explicit models. On the 
other hand, there are also modulation mechanisms, which can block certain models 
because of the meaning or the context of a proposition or because of pragmatic factors. 
Nonetheless, as regards the issue of this paper, it is only relevant that it is possible that 
individuals only consider the mental models of a proposition. In fact, this is exactly 
what Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009) argue for the disjunctive illusory inferences. 
In their opinion, the differentiation between mental models and fully explicit models not 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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only explains the usual conclusion that people draw from such inferences and the effects 
that certain information added to the premises can have, but also predicts them. These 
strengths of the mental models theory are shown in the next part. 
4. The mental models theory and the disjunctive illusory inferences 
Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009) carry out several experiments related to the 
disjunctive illusory inferences. I will not analyze all of them here because it can be 
superfluous and trivial. This is because some of their more controversial experimental 
conditions are representative enough and, if it is explained how the mental models 
theory accounts for them, it is obvious and evident how that same theory can account 
for the other experimental conditions. For this reason, I will focus only on the 
disjunctive illusory inferences used by Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009) that can be 
more illustrative. 
One of such inferences is as follows: 
“Suppose that only one of the following assertions is true: 
(1) You have the mints. 
(2) You have the gumballs or the lollipops, but not both. 
Also, supposes you have the mints. What, if anything, follows? Is it possible that 
you also have either the gumballs or the lollipops? Could you have both?” 
(Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 618). 
As indicated, the fully explicit models show that it is possible to have the mints, the 
gumballs, and the lollipops at the same time. Nevertheless, the mental models theory 
predicts that, faced to this task, most individuals will respond that you cannot have the 
three candies, since they will only consider these mental models: 
mints 
gumballs 
lollipops 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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Certainly, their experimental results will support their explanation and their prediction, 
since their participants tended to answer that the three candies could not be had at the 
same time.  
Other interesting experimental condition was this one: 
“Suppose that one of the following assertions is true and one is false. 
(1) You have the blue candies and the red candies. 
(2)  You  have  the  red  candies  or  else  the  orange  candies,  but  not  both” 
(Khemlani & Johnson‐Laird, 2009, p. 619). 
As stated by Khemlani and Johnson‐Laird (2009), the mental models are now: 
blue candies and red candies 
red candies 
orange candies 
 
Therefore, in their view, individuals should tend to respond ‘no’ to this question: 
“Is it possible to have only the blue candies and the orange candies?” (Khemlani 
& Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 619). 
Indeed, most their participants answered negatively to the question. However, the 
correct response is ‘yes’. This fact is demonstrated by the fully explicit models, which 
are these ones: 
blue candies and red candies and orange candies 
¬(blue candies) and red candies and ¬(orange candies) 
blue candies and ¬(red candies) and orange candies 
¬(blue candies) and ¬(red candies) and orange candies 
The third model –blue candies and ¬(red candies) and orange candies- makes clear that 
the blue candies and the orange candies can be had at the same time. Nevertheless, as 
said, according to Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009), people respond negatively 
because they only consider the mental models. 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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A little change in this last condition also showed, in their view, that their approach is 
correct. The final question was removed and instead this one was included: 
“Is it possible to have only red candies?” (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 
619). 
Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009) predict that their participants will answer ‘yes’ to 
this question. The reason is not, in their opinion, that the second fully explicit model -
¬(blue candies) and red candies and ¬(orange candies)- enables a situation in which the 
red candies are the only candies that are had. The reason is the fact that the second 
mental model –red candies- directly refers to that scenario. In any case, their 
participants´ responses were coherent with their prediction, since they tended to respond 
that it was possible to have red candies and not to have blue candies and orange candies. 
But other interesting point of Khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s (2009) experiments was 
that, in some conditions with the first version of the problem of the candies, i.e., the 
version in which it is asked whether or not it is possible a scenario with only the blue 
and orange candies, additional instruction were given. In particular, the participants 
were asked to review their response, and it was explicitly mentioned that they should 
confirm whether they had considered facts such as that only one premise was correct. 
This additional information improved the results and Khemlani and Johnson-Laird 
(2009) seem to interpret that the cause is that the additional information can lead one to 
take the fully explicit models into account. 
Finally, in other condition, the additional instructions consisted of a definition. This can 
be observed in the following example: 
“An entrée consists of one meat and one vegetable course. Suppose that one of 
the following assertions is true and one is false. 
(1) One course is meat, and one course is salad. 
(2) One course is salad, or else one course is vegetables. 
Is an entrée possible?” (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 621). 
As it can be noted, the formal structure of this version is the same as that of the first 
version of the problem of the candies. Nevertheless, what is important in it is that it also 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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improved the results. The explanation of this fact given by Khemlani and Johnson-Laird 
(2009) is that the initial definition leaded the participants to think about the fully explicit 
models. 
As mentioned, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s (2009) experiments include more 
experimental conditions. However, the described conditions are illustrative enough 
because it is obvious how the arguments commented in this section can be applied to the 
other conditions that I have not taken into account. In this way, what is relevant for this 
paper is that Khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s (2009) participants gave responses contrary 
to classical formal logic in the first two problems to which I have referred (the problem 
of the mints, the gumballs, and the lollipops, and the first version of the problem of the 
blue, red, and orange candies). It is true that the results were positive in the second 
version of the blue, red, and orange candies (i.e., the version corresponding to the 
question about the red candies) and that they significantly improved in the problems 
with additional instructions (both when such instructions asked to review the response 
and when they included a definition), but the mental models theory provides a 
framework that explains and predicts all these facts. Nevertheless, as indicated, I will try 
to prove that a syntactic approach based on formal rules can also account for these 
phenomena. 
5. Standard propositional calculus and the problem of the mints, the gumballs, and the 
lollipops 
Really, there are several theories that try to explain human reasoning from a syntactic or 
formal perspective. As indicated, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2009) explicitly quote 
two very representative theories of this kind: Rips (1994) and Braine and O´Brien 
(1998a). However, I will not assume any of those theories in particular here. My aim is 
only to demonstrate that the difficulties linked to the disjunctive illusory inferences do 
not prove that human mind does not follow basic logical principles or requirements. For 
this reason, just as a hypothesis for this paper, I will suppose that human reasoning 
works following the syntactic rules of standard propositional calculus and that it is 
coherent with frames such as that exposed by Gentzen (1934). I am aware that a 
hypothesis of this type is controversial and hard to accept, since the literature on 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
 
López Astorga: disjunctive illusory inferences 132 
cognitive science reveals that people do not seem to use some basic rules of standard 
propositional calculus, and that, because of this, some formal approaches do not admit 
all the rules of that calculus. This is the case, for example, of the mental logic theory 
described by Braine and O´Brien (1998). 
Nevertheless, I am assuming here the general hypothesis that standard logic leads 
human inferential activity because I want to show that any formal framework could, in 
principle, account for the problems of the disjunctive illusory inferences. Furthermore, I 
will also show below that the explanations that I will propose in this paper are not 
necessarily incompatible with approaches such as that of the mental logic theory. 
Thus, to analyze the disjunctive illusory inferences from standard propositional 
calculus, a first point needs to be considered. That calculus only has formal rules for 
inclusive disjunctions, not for exclusive disjunctions. This is an important point 
because, although standard propositional calculus has the means to work with exclusive 
disjunctions, this kind of disjunctions is not basic in that calculus, and it can be thought 
that the root of the problem is this one. 
 
Certainly, individuals´ mistake in the task of the mints, the gumballs, and the lollipops 
appears to be that they do not deny its second exclusive disjunction (q V r) correctly, 
and that they tend to deny that disjunction as they deny inclusive disjunctions. If we 
assume that ‘V’ stands for inclusive disjunction, it can be said that, while v(p V q) = 0 
both when v(p) = 1 and v(q) = 1 and when v(p) = 0 and v(q) = 0, v(p V q) = 0 only 
when v(p) = 0 and v(q) = 0 (see Table 2). 
Table 2.  Truth tables of exclusive and inclusive disjunction 
p q p V q p V q 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
Nevertheless, although the disjunction ‘you have the gumballs or the lollipops’ is 
exclusive in the mentioned problem, because Khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s most 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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participants respond that it is not possible to have the gumballs and the lollipops at the 
same time, it seems that they deny that disjunction as if it were inclusive. Therefore, if it 
is assumed that human mind works using formal rules, it is necessary to explain why 
this fact occurs. 
A possible account can be found in the way standard propositional calculus enables to 
consider exclusive disjunctions. In that calculus, an inclusive disjunction can be 
transformed into an exclusive disjunction by means of an additional formula, and such 
an additional formula can be, if we assume that ‘&’ is the logical conjunction, for 
example: 
¬(p & q) 
Indeed, a new formula can be built by supposing that the formulae p V q and ¬(p & q) 
are two conjuncts linked by ‘&’: 
(p V q) & ¬(p & q) 
As shown in Table 3, the truth-values of this last formula are the same as those of 
exclusive disjunction. It hence is an adequate formula for expressing exclusive 
disjunction in standard propositional calculus. 
Table 3. Truth-values of (p V q) & ¬(p & q) and p V q 
p q p V q p & q ¬(p & q) (p V q) & ¬(p & q) p V q 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
 
However, the difficulty of the problem of the mints, the gumballs, and the lollipops is 
that includes three propositional variables. That problem allows establishing the 
following equivalences: 
p: ‘you have the mints’. 
q: ‘you have the gumballs’. 
r: ‘you have the lollipops’. 
In this way, it can be thought that individuals tend to formalize it as follows: 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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A: [p V (q V r)] & ¬[p & (q V r)] & ¬(q V r) 
In A, the second conjunct -¬[p & (q V r)]- transforms p V (q V r) into an exclusive 
disjunction and the third conjunct -¬(q & r)- transforms q V r into an exclusive 
disjunction. If A is assumed as a logical form that contains the information transmitted, 
this derivation can be made: 
[p V (q V r)] & ¬[p & (q V r)] & ¬(q & r) (premise) 
p (premise) 
¬(q & r) (&E, 1) 
Where step 2 is the assumption that ‘you have the mints’ and ‘&E’ refers to a basic 
logical rule that holds in standard propositional calculus: the conjunction elimination 
rule (x & y; ergo x). 
As it can be noted, only an inferential step (step 3) is needed to draw the conclusion that 
you do not have the gumballs and the lollipops. 
Nonetheless, if the disjunctions p V (q V r) and q V r are exclusive, why is it possible to 
deduce this conclusion (recall that q V r is also false when both q and r are true)? It is 
not hard to respond to this question. Individuals assuming A do not note that ¬(q & r) is 
not just a conjunct, but also an essential part of the formula q V r when interpreted as 
exclusive. In this way, the real logical form of the problem is not A, but B. 
B: {p V [(q V r) & ¬(q & r)]} & ¬{p & [(q V r) & ¬(q & r)]} 
This is the mistake that individuals often make in problems such as that of mints, the 
gumballs, and the lollipops. The mistake, given that B is a formula really difficult and 
complex, and that working memory and human intellectual abilities and skills are 
limited, is absolutely understandable, possible, and plausible. And, in addition, it clearly 
explains why khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s (2009) participants responded, in problems 
with this structure, that the cases of q & r could not be true. 
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López Astorga: disjunctive illusory inferences 135 
6. Standard propositional calculus and the problem of the blue, red, and orange candies 
If we continue to accepting the arguments of the previous section, it can be said that 
individuals tend to consider that the logical form of the problem of the blue, red, and 
orange candies is this one: 
C: [(p & q) V (q V r)] & ¬[(p & q) & (q V r)] & ¬(q & r) 
Where the equivalences are these ones: 
p: ‘you have the blue candies’. 
q: ‘you have the red candies’. 
r: ‘you have the orange candies’. 
Obviously, in C, the second conjunct -¬[(p & q) & (q V r)]- transforms (p & q) V (q V 
r) into a exclusive disjunction. ¬(q & r) in turn transforms q V r into an exclusive 
disjunction. 
The difficulties of this problem are two. On the one hand, it does not enable to clearly 
deduce the response to the question of its first version, that is, whether or not you can 
have both the blue candies and the orange candies. On the other hand, the possible 
derivation requires many steps, and it can be thought that the more steps are required in 
an inference, the greater will be the complexity of that inference for individuals. 
Certainly, the derivation corresponding to the first version could be as follows: 
(1) [(p & q) V (q V r)] & ¬[(p & q) & (q V r)] & ¬(q & r) (premise) 
(2) p & q (assumption) 
(3) q (&E, 2) 
(4) Steps 2-3 are eliminated 
(5) q V r (assumption) 
(6) r (assumption) 
(7) ¬(q & r) (&E, 1) 
(8) ¬q (MPT, 6, 7) 
clac 60/2014, 122-143 
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(10) ¬(p & q) (MPT, 5, 9) 
(11) … 
Where ‘MPT’ is Chrysippus´ modus ponendo tollens [¬(x & y), x; ergo ¬y], a rule that 
also holds in standard propositional calculus. 
Given that there is not second premise, it can be thought that individuals begin 
assuming the possibility of p & q being true (step 2). Nonetheless, this assumption leads 
to q (step 3), i.e., to a scenario in which it is not possible only p and r. Step 4 hence 
consists of noting that, if v(p & q) = 1, then it is not possible that v(p) = 1, v(r) = 1, v(q) 
= 0. The second possibility is to assume q V r (step 5). Thus, two new possibilities are 
opened now: q and r. The possibility of q cannot be taken into account, since, again, if q 
is true, it is not possible a scenario with p, r, and ¬q. Therefore, the next step is directly 
to suppose r (step 6), but r only leads to ¬q (step 8) and ¬(p & q) (step 10), which means 
that it does not enable to deduce p. 
Evidently, p is possible in a scenario in which v(r) = 1 –and hence v(q v r) = 1- because, 
although it is true that p cannot be drawn, it is also true that r does not necessarily lead 
to ¬p. Nonetheless, because many steps are required (and individuals can stop the 
derivation before completing it) and it is not possible to obtain p in a direct way in the 
scenarios that can be supposed, it is obvious that individuals can tend to respond that p 
and r cannot be true at the same time, which explains the majority answer in Khemlani 
and Johnson-Laird´s (2009) experiment. 
The case in which the possibility of the red candies (q) is asked is different. As it can be 
checked in the previous deduction, it is very easy to note that q is possible, since step 3 
already indicates it. Furthermore, it can also be supposed that, in the condition in which 
additional instructions were presented, the indication to review and check whether or 
not the meanings of the propositions had been correctly understood could lead 
Khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s participants to realize that the fact that p cannot be 
derived does not imply that p is false (at least until ¬p is drawn). And this circumstance 
could be the cause of the improvement in participants´ responses. Likewise, something 
similar could happen in the problem of the entrée, which had the same structure as that 
of the blue, red, and orange candies. The definition of the entrée (p & r) could help the 
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participants to note that, if ¬p has not been deduced, it cannot be said that p is false or 
impossible. 
Therefore the previous arguments show that formal or syntactic approaches can explain, 
and even predict, most individuals´ responses in reasoning tasks referring to the 
disjunctive illusory inferences, and that the mental models theory is not the only 
framework that can do it. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the literature on cognitive science 
proves that a frame exclusively based on standard propositional calculus is hard to 
accept. I will address this issue in the next section. 
7. Disjunctive illusory inferences and the mental logic theory 
Indeed, the literature shows that, in several experiments involving simple logical rules 
holding in standard propositional calculus, people tend to respond incorrectly, This fact 
can lead one to assume that, because it seems that the mental models theory does not 
have those problems, and this last theory can explain most cognitive phenomena, the 
mental models theory is the only valid theory. However, the findings of the literature 
need to be qualified and understood. 
It is true that several experimental results (e.g., those of Orenes and Johnson-Laird, 
2012) reveal us that certain basic logical rules –such as, for example, the conditional 
introduction rule (x; ergo x -> y, where ‘->’ is the logical conditional) or the disjunction 
introduction rule (x; ergo x V y) are not often applied by people. Nevertheless, neither 
of those problematic rules is used in the previous deductions. In my view, it is possible 
to assume a formal framework and, at the same time, to claim that human beings do not 
usually apply all the rules of standard propositional calculus. It is possible even to think 
that some persons, for any reason, are more likely to use certain rules. In this way, to 
assume a syntactic approach does not mean to suppose that human mind is like a 
computer that only applies logical rules in automatic and mechanical way. A formal 
theory can also admit that not all the inferences made by human beings are rational or 
logical, and that many everyday conclusions that people draw are caused by the action 
of heuristics or biases. A syntactic approach can hence be compatible with theories such 
as the dual-process theory (e.g., Evans, 2008; Reyna, 2004; Stanovich, 1999, 2004, 
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2012), which distinguishes different systems or processes in human mind, and raises 
that reasoning includes both heuristic and biased activities and analytical and logical 
inferences. 
The mental logic theory is particularly interesting in this way, since, in addition to 
holding ideas consistent with those of the precedent paragraph (O´Brien, 1998), it only 
accepts the formal rules of standard propositional calculus that, according to empirical 
data, people really use. Thus, this theory is based on experimental results and does not 
admit any rule of classical logic that is not supported by empirical findings. The result is 
a powerful theory whose fundamental theses are consistent with many experimental 
data reported by the literature on cognitive science. Although this theory does not accept 
that human reasoning works in accordance with truth tables and I have resorted to tables 
of that kind in my arguments, I suspect that a possible explanation of the disjunctive 
illusory inferences offered from the mental logic theory would not be incompatible with 
that proposed by me in this paper. I will indicate why. 
Mental logic, as said, is not standard propositional calculus (other important point in 
this regard is that the mental logic theory does not admit the material interpretation of 
conditional), but I think that the aspects of classical logic that the mental logic theory 
rejects are not included in my account. At least in its version exposed by Braine and 
O´Brien (1998b), the mental logic theory does not seem to distinguish between 
exclusive and inclusive disjunctions. This theory states that there is a connection 
between pragmatics and the logical rules of reasoning (Braine & O´Brien, 1998c), but, 
in my view, it would not be hard to admit, from its framework, that exclusive 
disjunction can be expressed by means of the formula (p V q) & ¬(p & q). On the other 
hand, what is most important is that, in my formal demonstrations, I have only used two 
rules, &E and MPT, which are included in the set of rules accepted by the mental logic 
theory. In particular &E corresponds to the schema 9 proposed by Braine and O´Brien 
(1998b) and they consider it to be a ‘Feeder Schema’ (that is, a schema that is applied 
when it is needed). Likewise, Braine and O´Brien (1998b) think that MPT is a ‘Core 
Schema’ (that is a schema that people apply every time they can do it) and it 
corresponds to their schema number 4. 
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For these reasons, from my point of view, although to assume that standard 
propositional calculus leads human reasoning is problematic and controversial, my 
arguments can be accepted, since they appear to be coherent with other theories based 
on formal rules that do not admit all the rules and requirements of classical logic. After 
all, the idea that human inferential activity follows standard propositional calculus has 
only been a hypothesis in this paper. 
8. Conclusions 
It seems that both the mental models theory and a syntactic approach based on formal 
logic can account for the problem of the disjunctive illusory inferences. This fact is not 
really unusual, since, as shown, for example, by López Astorga (2013), there are other 
cognitive phenomena that can be explained both from the semantic framework of the 
mental models theory and from formal theories. Thus, it could be thought that each of 
these two approaches refers to a different way of expressing the same facts, or, in other 
words, that each of these two approaches explain the same facts using a different 
language. 
However, to assume this last idea does not appear to be appropriate. From a 
psychological point of view, the mental models theory and the syntactic frameworks 
describe different processes, which means that both approaches cannot be admitted at 
the same time. So, it seems that a decisive or crucial experiment is needed for 
identifying some phenomenon that can be explained by the mental models theory and 
that a formal theory cannot account for (or vice versa). It is true that, in many cases, as, 
for example, in this paper, the explanations from a formal framework are post hoc. 
However, the formal rules theories also raise their predictions and check them by means 
of experiments. In fact, as it can be seen in works such as that of Braine and O´Brien 
(1998a), the predictions of the mental logic theory are often confirmed. Thus, although 
it must be acknowledged that the mental models theory can predict and explain human 
intellectual activities in most cases, the idea that formal theories can also do it cannot be 
absolutely rejected. 
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The issue that the syntactic approaches need to clarify is that related to the 
formalization. It is well known that natural language expressions do not always directly 
refer to the same logical operators. The context and the meaning of the expressions can 
lead one to attribute different logical operators to a same proposition in different 
scenarios. This is not a new problem and the disjunctive illusory inferences are not the 
inferences that show it for the first time. Therefore, a difficulty that the formal rules 
theories need to solve is that related to the exact procedures by which natural language 
expressions are translated into logical forms. In the particular case of the disjunctive 
illusory inferences, I have proposed that an adequate form for exclusive disjunction is (p 
V q) & ¬(p & q), but maybe it is necessary to describe a more rigorous and systematic 
procedure. In this way, it can be said that my logical form of exclusive disjunctions is 
only one of the possible forms that can be thought. Other form could be, for example, (p 
V q) & [(p -> ¬q) & (q -> ¬p)]. This problem hence requires further empirical research. 
It is obvious that to find an algorithm that allows us to identify whether a disjunction is 
inclusive or exclusive is a very hard task (perhaps an impossible task), but to propose a 
more or less systematic procedure for that does seem an easier and possible task. Be that 
as it may, it seems that this procedure is not necessary just in the case of inclusive and 
exclusive disjunctions, but also in that of other controversial logical operators, for 
example, conditional. 
Nevertheless, an even more important matter that should be more explored is that 
referring to the mechanisms that improve individuals´ conclusions when they face to 
disjunctive illusory inferences. Khemlani and Johnson-Laird´s (2009) experiments show 
that they obtain better conclusions when the additional instruction of reviewing their 
responses or a definition are included, but it continues to be unclear exactly how that 
additional instruction or that definition can improve the results. In this way, a detailed 
description of the process by which those elements influence individuals´ answers is 
also required. It is needed to indicate under what conditions and circumstances the 
results can be better and under what conditions and circumstances the results can be 
worse. And this problem is more important than the previous ones because the mental 
models theory must also solve it. 
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